Monday, February 25, 2013


81. Serenity or excitement?

According to Schopenhauer artistic genius is exceptional in its capability to escape from the drive of the will towards ever new unsatisfiable desires, into the serene contemplation of platonic, pure, eternal ideas. It is an escape from the emotional into the intellectual. For Nietzsche, by contrast, artistic genius is a manifestation of the will to power, in creative destruction. Schopenhauer lauded asceticism, breakdown of the will, Nietzsche abhorred it. Schopenhauer sought serenity, Nietzsche sought Dionysian exuberance.

So, is art serene contemplation of order, harmony? Or is it excitement in transcending order, breaking harmony? Nietzsche made the distinction between on the one hand the Apollonian, representing the harmonious, the static, the eternal, and on the other hand the Dionysian, representing the disharmony, intoxication, the dynamic, creative destruction.

According to Schopenhauer a work of art is the perfect representation of a universal, or constitutes a new universal by itself. But perhaps it is the opposite: a denial of the universal, the triumph of the individual, something in its own that does not fit any universal. A declaration of independence.

If the intellectual is the contemplation of the universal, then the rebellion of the individual is the emotional, romantic, and art is emotion, not an escape from the will but a celebration of it, but the Nietzschean, not the Schopenhauerian will.

But I don’t agree that the intellectual is just serene contemplation of the universal, the eternal, the harmony. I think it also includes the exhilaration of the novel connection, the shift, the breakthrough, the discovery. 

And yet, I admit, serenity also is part of artistic experience. It can be contemplation in a feeling of time standing still, of a balance, a harmony achieved.

My panel of artists rejects the separation of harmony and destruction. It is both, they say. Can art be both Apollo and Dionysus, serenity and excitement, enjoying and breaking balance? How, then, would the two combine or connect?

As follows, perhaps. The excitement lies in having an idea, a hunch, but then it needs to be realized, be ‘made to work’. In scientific discovery also, a famous scientist once said ‘I have got an idea but I don’t yet know how to get it’. When is a work of art finished? When the artist has the feeling that it is, when there is nothing to be added or subtracted, when ‘it is just right’. A mathematical theorem has beauty in that way: just right, incontrovertible, nothing too much nor too little. That, perhaps, is where the harmony lies.       

Perhaps here again, as in the discussion of invention (in item 31 of this blog), and in the discussion of the change of meaning (in item 37), the cycle of change discussed there applies. From the carriage of existing harmony into novel contexts, the material and inspiration for change arise, in novel combinations that break through limits, to achieve an emergent novelty that is next ordered, reduced and polished into a new harmony.

Beyond the level of the individual piece of art, on the level of culture, evidence for this is found in the fact that new artistic and intellectual impulses have typically arisen at the crossroads of cultures, as the Renaissance in northern Italy. The novel enters from the periphery to create a new centre, where the novelty becomes the mainstream and may then consolidate into a new orthodoxy. 

Monday, February 18, 2013


80. Art

 Here I start a series on art. It is based in part on a discussion with a panel of three artists and a well-known architect.

In classical Greek philosophy the beautiful was identified with the true and the good. A strong Platonic tradition, which manifests itself in Schopenhauer, for example, is that artistic experience is a serene contemplation of eternal, immutable ideas. In this way art, in particular music, helps to escape, temporarily, from the relentless drive of our will towards the satisfaction of ever new desires that is never achieved.

In another tradition, art was seen as mimesis, imitation of nature or a representation of religious, historical or mythical figures or scenes.

Under the influence of the philosopher Kant, art was seen to form a category of its own, next to the true or the good.

If art is no longer associated with the good, then the horrendous, the ugly, even evil could be art, as in Dostojevsky, Mallarmé, Céline, and de Sade.

In romanticism, art became the revelation, the authentic expression, of what is delved from inside the self. Here, art is still representational, but it now represents something from inside, not out in he world.

Does a work of art have some canonical, correct or true meaning, referring to some entity in the world or in imagination? Gadamer proposed that art does not have one true interpretation of what the artist intended. The viewer or listener brings in his or her interpretative, creative arsenal of spiritual, emotional and intellectual mental frames adopted and developed along the course of life.

According to Heidegger, art does not represent anything but stands in its own, creating a new world. Albert Camus, in his The rebel, recognized art as creating an alternative reality. As discussed in the item on power (nr. 50) in this blog, this may yield an escape from institutionalized power. For Nietzsche art is creative destruction, and a transformation of the self, not a delving from it.

If art needs to be useful, to survive the present onslaught of economization on culture, it is not mere opportunistic rhetoric to say that it is an exercise in world making and as such is conducive to innovation. 

How could this work? Earlier, in items 32-34 (on meaning) of this blog, I proposed that people categorize (assign to concepts) what they see or hear by picking out features that fit in their mental make-up of concepts and associations that constitute their absorptive capacity. That is how they make sense of the world. Perhaps what art does is to offer new features that confuse, upset or bypass established categorization. It may trigger novel associations that do not fit the customary frame or script. Thus it may loosen existing categories and suggest new ‘ways of world making’. It may ‘not make sense’ and thereby generate novel sense making.

According to my small panel of artists, art is expression, shaping. It comes from a conscious idea, meaning, decision, choice, design. It is intentional, it does not arise haphazardly or by chance, as it might for an amateur. And to be professional is to fully go for it. You cannot be a bit of an artist.

Tuesday, February 12, 2013


79 The cost of incommensurability

In this blog I have pleaded for an Aristotelian virtue ethics, according to which there are values in life that have intrinsic value, in contrast with consequentialist ethics that is focused on consequences, such as utility (see items 15 and 39). Virtues have no other goals than themselves, forming a broad notion of happiness. Deeds not only have an extrinsic, instrumental value but also intrinsic value.

The uppermost virtue is realization of potential (for Aristotle this was mostly intellectual potential, but I draw it wider than that). Other virtues are moral courage, empathy, moderation, prudence, and justice.

Also, again as according to Aristotle, happiness is not only a feeling or psychological state but lies especially in action. In human action there is no overarching measure, no guaranteed commensurability, of what is good; not all good things can be reduced to a single measure such as pleasure or utility. One cannot add up happiness in love, attending a concert, sympathy for others, etc. They do not have a common measure by which they can be traded off against each other, as economists are wont to do, from their perspective of a utilitarian ethics.

But I grant that we should not be blind to consequences. Incommensurability carries a cost. If values cannot be simply traded off against each other, then choices require debate between different perspectives associated with different values. In economic parlance, incommensurability yields high transaction costs. I would prefer to modify that term. The debate is not a matter of transactions or pure exchange, but of interchange that modifies views and opinions and aims to cross cognitive distance (see items 57, 58), trying to bridge differences of view and opinion or recombine them in a new, common opinion, in some kind of crossover

So, for economic reasons we should not assume incommensurability where it is not strictly needed. In other words, we should try to make trade-offs whenever that seems warranted.

When it is not warranted we have to leave it up to debate, to political decision-making. It is the task of politics to deal with incommensurability. That is why it should not be left to economists who do not recognize incommensurability. But then, citizens should also voluntarily put in the effort involved in the debate. They also should not leave it up to technocrats.

Next, to take into account specific conditions of individuals, time and place, such debate often needs to be conducted locally, in communities. That is needed also for the reason that otherwise the number of people involved would be too large. In classical Athens the people eligible for participation in the debate were just small enough to manage, in the public square (agora). In modern societies the number is too large and the debate must be left, in many cases, to the usual channelling through political parties. But as much room as possible should be allowed for debate in local communities. Perhaps politicians need to be rid of their agoraphobia. 

Wednesday, February 6, 2013


78 How to differentiate

 At several places in this blog (items 15 - 17, for example) I have opposed universalism, including universalist moral rules, and I have pleaded for differentiation; for taking into account variety of individuals and conditions. I also argued that in human affairs there are multiple dimensions of merit that cannot all be added and subtracted (are incommensurable). I have pleaded for collaboration between people that rests at least in part on personal trust.

How far does all that go, and how would it work? What are the limits of bypassing strict and universal rules? What are the implications for justice? Can we do without universal rights?

In an article in The New York Times of 7 January 2013, Stanley Fish pleaded for outright favouritism and nepotism, in granting appointments, rewards, and projects, and in imposing sanctions. Accepting articles for publication should not be ‘double blind’ (reviewer and author not knowing each other’s identity) as the rules require, but should take into account personal experience and views, and knowledge about past research performance, educational background, etc. It is in any case an illusion, he says, and I agree, that reviewers are fully objective. They have their prejudices, hobbies, vanities and methodological and programmatic preferences. The single standard of merit, he claims, disregards ideology, politics, shared history, personality, authority, and trustworthiness.

In the light of what I have been saying in this blog, must I agree with Fish? I don’t.

Fish confuses two things. On the one hand there is the use of personal, informal information on a variety of dimensions of conduct that are relevant for judging some-one’s performance and potential, other than only narrow and imperfect objective measures. On the other hand there is sheer favouritism that discounts or disregards aptitude. I agree with the first, not the latter.

How would warranted differentiation work? One rule is to show what role personal considerations have played and to submit this to independent others, to judge relevance and reliability. That is why for appointments and projects there are, or should be, committees with independent, outside members, and for accepting publications there are teams of reviewers or editors. That should help to reduce the effects of prejudice and bias.

Then there still is asymmetry of rights and access. Let us consider appointments. Candidates that do not happen to personally know any of the decision makers should then be invited to submit references to people they know who are then invited to take part in the process and give their views. And if candidates cannot specify such references, they should be personally interviewed with additional care.

In sum, one can oppose strict universalism and allow for special pleading, to differentiate, taking into account individual variety and variety of conditions, without surrendering to favouritism. There can be fairness without assumptions of equality. A distinction should be made between equality of quality and equality of access to candidacy and to pleading. The first is nonsense and the second is to be carefully maintained.

Friday, February 1, 2013


77. Beyond Enlightenment and Romanticism

Charles Taylor noted that in contemporary society there is an uneasy mix of ideas from Enlightenment and Romanticism. From the Enlightenment: ideas of universality and rationality (rational design, rational choice, efficiency, rigorous analysis, …). From Romanticism: diversity, individuality, feelings and emotions, realization of the authentic self, self-expression, …

We find the Enlightenment in universal, equal human and citizen rights. We find it in rationalization in science, management, and increasingly also in public administration (e.g. in health care, education, …).

The rationalized economic system tends to constrain innovation. Innovation carries radical uncertainty that undermines rational choice and hence economic thought. It thrives on diversity and deviation from rules and established practices. It is, in other words, romantic and does not fit well in a rationalized economic system. That is why innovation policy is so difficult.

We find Romanticism in the private sphere of self, family, friends, clubs, and in entrepreneurship, art and discovery.

Is this combination of opposites a problem?

While economic rationalization is perhaps accepted as inevitable, it also yields the experience of clashes and tension. How humanistic is rationalized health care? Many people feel alienated in a uniformity of rules, jobs, and performance measurement, in increasingly impersonal, anonymous relations. Gaps are felt between the economic world and the life world.

To narrow the gap, should personal life be further rationalized, as economists prod us to do? Or should public life be romanticized? We see both happening.

Politics is made more romantic by making it more expressive and emotional, in a personalization of political figures as public idols. I am deeply suspicious of the hyping of public emotion.

Markets are romantic in that, in contrast with central planning, they tap into diversity of tastes, ideas and local conditions. Firms profit from differentiation of products, and this contributes to variety. But then, more privatization, making more room for markets, also in public services, must, to be consistent, allow for variety of quality and accessibility in public services. But this violates enlightenment universality and equality of citizen’s rights in those services. Is that to be accepted? 

Paradoxically, while markets allow for variety, market ideology is universal, applied everywhere, and market rhetoric mostly neglects the diversity of institutional and local conditions. As a result of this neglect, privatization and deregulation run into unforeseen problems that necessitate increasingly complex partial re-regulation, supervision and intervention to make markets actually work or to redress their perverse effects. In the end one wonders what the net benefit is. 

However, perhaps the most important factor in present society is held in common between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, and that is the almost obsessive pre-occupation with the disconnected, autonomous individual that knows best what it wants That has run into excessive egotism, narcissism and atomization of society.

To get away from that we need a new way beyond both Enlightenment and Romanticism. For that I proposed principles of otherhumanism, indicated in item 65 of this blog, and discussed more extensively in my 2012 book ‘Beyond humanism: The flourishing of life, self and other’.