330. How to discriminate
Discrimination happens all the time. Some people get
better jobs than others, more reward for the same job, more civil rights, and
rewards while not doing anything for it. Discrimination has a bad name, but in
some cases it is defensible, even laudable. What is what here?
When defensible it is better called distinction. One
gets more according to clear criteria, such as accomplishment, as in winning a
prize, or in selection based on talent. How about looks? Why not, if there is
selection according to height or strength?
Looks and talent are based on luck, a draw in the
lotteries of genes and location of birth. Accomplishment also requires courage,
commitment, endurance, sacrifice, resilience, and absorbing pain. Mere looks do
not.
When, then, does distinction switch into
discrimination? Looks may not require effort but are at least individual.
Discrimination arises, I think, when distinction is based on mere membership of
a group, according to race, religion, ideology, gender, or age, regardless of
individual characteristics or actions.
Is that always to be condemned? What about membership
of the Ku Klux Klan, a fascist or a terrorist group? Usually, discrimination is
considered all right when politically correct, in a certain community. Its moral
acceptability depends on what form it takes. It is wrong when resulting in unequal
civil rights, such as refusing fascists the rights to a fair trial, or freedom
of expression short of inciting violence or hatred. It is not necessarily wrong
if n those rights are maintained and, again, people are treated as individuals,
not merely as members of a group.
Is profiling all right then, according to race, for
example, where group membership is not used by itself, for judgement, let alone
conviction, but only as a trigger for attention, based on crime statistics,
say, for further investigation of individual conduct,?
In this blog I have argued for virtues far beyond
economic merits of efficiency or utility, but efficiency is still one of many
considerations. There is an argument of efficiency here: given the statistics and
scarce resources of control, it is efficient to focus on certain groups. But is
that the practice? What if people were profiled as bankers, say, for further
investigation of ethical conduct, given the experience of unethical banking? Or
are statistics used selectively as an excuse for unethical, discriminatory
profiling?